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INTRODUCTION
Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr. has recently and eloquently
championed judicial reliance on unpublished opinions.1  Judge
Martin, who speaks from more than two decades of service on the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, substantially
improves understanding of this court.  Judge Martin informally and
pragmatically scrutinizes critical problems that confront the modern
regional circuits through the prism of unpublished determinations
while elucidating judicial dependence on these decisions. Judge
Martin apologizes for the dearth of empirical data on the decisions’
invocation, but the jurist affords subjective opinions, personal views,
and revealing anecdotes based on practical experience.
Judge Martin also impeccably timed his article’s publication, which
coincided with the December 1998 issuance by the Commission on
Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (the
Commission) of its final report and suggestions.2  The Commission
had one year to study the appellate “system, with particular reference
to the Ninth Circuit,” and to write a report with recommendations for
such change as may be appropriate for prompt, fair, and effective
caseload resolution.3  The thorough Commission evaluation
illuminates Judge Martin’s endeavor and supplies some information
that Judge Martin did not.  For example, the commissioners indicate
the percentage of oral arguments provided and visiting judges
employed by each court.4  These propositions mean that Judge
Martin’s In Defense of Unpublished Opinions5 warrants a response and
that its ideas can be usefully compared with the Commission work.
This essay undertakes that effort.
First, the Essay descriptively assesses Judge Martin’s account of the
modern Sixth Circuit, attempting to derive instructive perspectives
                                                                
1. See Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177
(1999).
2. See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF
APPEALS, FINAL REPORT (Dec. 18, 1998), available at http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/
final/appstruc.pdf [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
3. See Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305(a)(1), 111 Stat. 2440, 2491 (1997) (detailing
the establishment and responsibilities of the Commission on Structural Alternatives
for the Federal Courts of Appeals).
4. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 22, tbl. 2-6 (affording the percentage
of cases decided on the merits that had oral arguments; for example, in 1997 the 6th
Circuit held oral argument in 50% of cases and the 9th Circuit in 39%); COMMISSION
ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, WORKING PAPERS
108, Tbl. 6a (1997) [hereinafter WORKING PAPERS] (illustrating the frequency with
which visiting judges decide appeals on the merits).
5. See Martin, supra note 1.
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from it.6  This Essay finds that Judge Martin’s article yields helpful
insights, especially regarding use of those decisions and concepts
which he premises on twenty years of dispute resolution.  Despite the
value of his views, however, few of these ideas have empirical support
and the emphasis on unpublished determinations is rather narrow,
thus complicating the formulation of definitive conclusions about
how the Sixth Circuit actually functions.
Second, this Essay descriptively evaluates the Commission study in
an effort to enhance comprehension of the Sixth Circuit.7  I ascertain
that the Commission assembled, analyzed, and synthesized much
empirical data.  This information advances appreciation of the Sixth
Circuit, particularly by facilitating comparisons, which confirm and
challenge perspectives articulated by Judge Martin.  The material
correspondingly suggests that the court may perform less well than it
could and less effectively than numerous other tribunals.  However,
the Commission’s ideas, even in combination with Judge Martin’s
views, are not broad or refined enough to permit conclusive findings.
Third, this Essay provides recommendations to increase
understanding of the Sixth Circuit and improve its operations.8  For
instance, the collection, assessment, and synthesis of additional
empirical data, especially together with the information compiled by
Judge Martin and the Commission, would yield more certain
determinations.  The court should also consult ways that the tribunal
works less efficaciously than it might and adopt measures that would
enhance circuit operations.
I. ANALYSIS OF IN DEFENSE OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
A. Descriptive Analysis
Judge Martin persuasively defends invocation of unpublished
opinions while providing valuable perspectives on the Sixth Circuit.
The jurist opens his article, In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, by
asserting that the growth in caseloads and concomitantly published
dispositions threatens to overwhelm the courts.9 Judge Martin
                                                                
6. See infra notes 9-60 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 61-116 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 118-53 and accompanying text.
9. See Martin, supra note 1, at 177 (stating that appellate judges are encumbered
by “the weight of tens of thousands of appeals every year, and [that] our ‘multiplied
utterances’ would increase beyond all reason were we forced to publish all our
opinions”); see also Gilbert S. Merritt, The Decision Making Process in the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1385, 1386 (1990) (stating that an increase in caseloads has
overburdened judges and diminished the quality of opinions).
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contends that unpublished decisions are a “pressure valve . . . a way to
pan for judicial gold while throwing the less influential opinions back
into the stream.”10  He also claims that the federal appellate judiciary
considers unpublished determinations a “necessary, and not
necessarily evil, part of the job.”11  Judge Martin predicted that these
ideas would receive support from responses to an informal Judicial
Conference survey—respecting courts’ inconsistent use and citation
of unpublished decisions and continuing designation of some
dispositions as unpublished—because his colleagues on the Sixth
Circuit and other tribunals are satisfied with the status quo.12  Judge
Martin proved prescient, as the courts’ chief judges voiced nearly
unanimous opposition to change.13  Judge Martin juxtaposes the
above views with those of legal academicians who find that
unpublished opinions create many systemic problems.14 He
enumerates a litany of criticisms—“loss of precedent, sloppy
decisions, lack of uniformity, difficulty of higher court review,
                                                                
10. Martin, supra note 1, at 178 (arguing that unpublished opinions serve to filter
unnecessary information and reduce the publication burden of the court).  See
generally THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL— THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S.
COURTS OF APPEALS 119-35 (1994) (arguing that unpublished opinions serve to filter
unnecessary information and lessen the publication burden of the courts’ opinions).
11. Martin, supra note 1, at 178-79 (citation omitted); see, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS:  CHALLENGE AND REFORM 171 (1996) (contending that the
benefits of limited publication of opinions generally outweigh the costs of not doing
so); Philip Nichols, Jr.,  Selective Publication of Opinions:  One Judge’s View, 35 AM. U. L.
REV. 909, 921 (1986) (stating that although an opinion that is rejected for
publication may later prove valuable, this does not of itself justify an abandonment of
the current system of selective publication).
12. See Letter from Circuit Judge Will L. Garwood, Chair, Advisory Comm. on
Appellate Rules, to Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit (Jan. 28, 1998) (on file with American University Law Review) (arguing that
most members of the court feel strongly that some opinions should remain
unpublished); see also 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994) (stating that the Judicial Conference is
the federal courts’ policymaking arm); Martin, supra note 1, at 179-80 (citations
omitted).  But cf.  Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding
unpublished opinions unconstitutional), vacated en banc, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 32055
(Dec. 18, 2000).
13. See, e.g., Letter from Ralph K. Winter, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, to Circuit Judge Will L. Garwood, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules
(Feb. 4, 1998) (on file with American University Law Review) (“I strongly believe that
Courts of Appeals should be permitted to continue to designate some opinions as
unpublished . . . .”); see also Memorandum re: Item No. 91-17, from Patrick J. Schiltz,
Reporter, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, to Advisory Comm. on Appellate
Rules (Mar. 12, 1998) (on file with American University Law Review).
14. See, e.g., PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 39-41 (1976) (arguing
in favor of published opinions and analyzing the problems of reliance on
unpublished opinions); Martin, supra note 1, at 180 (presenting a list of common
criticisms of unpublished opinions); Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable
Opinion:  Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940, 946 (1989) (relating common concerns about the use
of unpublished opinions).
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unfairness to litigants, less judicial accountability, less
predictability”—which scholars have leveled at judges for relying on
these dispositions.15
The second section of Judge Martin’s article justifies the use of
unpublished determinations because the appeals courts receive too
many cases that lack sufficient importance.16 Judge Martin explains
that federal jurisdiction’s inexorable expansion, steady docket
growth, and parties’ enhanced willingness to appeal mean that
caseloads have “become larger and more diluted in merit.”17 Judge
Martin believes that none of these trends regarding input will
change.18  Judge Martin thus broaches the possibility of modifying
output by requiring the publication of all decisions.19  He rejects this
prospect because it would reduce quality “by stretching judicial
resources even more” through increases in “remarkably brief and
uninformative, but nonetheless ‘published,’ opinions.”20 Judge Martin
premises these quantitative and qualitative ideas on “personal
experience” and on anecdotes derived from his service as a law
clerk;21 however, he bolsters other views with empirical data.22
                                                                
15. Martin, supra note 1, at 180; see, e.g., POSNER,  supra note 11, at 165-68
(highlighting several criticisms of unpublished opinions, including lack of careful
preparation, the suppression of opinions with high precedential value, and
disadvantages to one-shot litigants who may have difficulty accessing unpublished
materials); Robert Martineau, Restrictions on Publication and Citation of Judicial
Opinions:  A Reassessment, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 119, 120 (1995) (evaluating
criticisms of restricting publication, namely loss of judicial accountability, the
difficulty of appellate review, the problem of predicting precedential value, and
inequalities of access to unpublished opinions).
16. See Martin, supra note 1, at 181-83 (addressing the problems caused by the
volume of briefs submitted to the court); see also Nichols, supra note 11, at 919
(arguing that the large number of federal appeals filed necessitates a selective
publication policy).
17. Martin, supra note 1, at 183.  For analysis of the first three ideas, see
COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 10-16, 44-45 (1995) [hereinafter LONG
RANGE PLAN]; JUDITH MCKENNA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS:  REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS AND THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 9-53 (1993).
18. See Martin, supra note 1, at 182; see also FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE,
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 109 (1990) [hereinafter REPORT OF
THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE] (addressing the “crisis of volume” in federal
appellate courts); Merritt, supra note 9, at 1388 (stating that parties to cases generally
seek oral argument, even though the appellate courts are moving away from
argument because of rising caseloads).  But see WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4, at 128-
33 (challenging the widely-held view that the increase in caseloads in the Courts of
Appeals is attributable to an across-the-board desire to appeal).
19. See Martin, supra note 1, at 183; see also William M. Richman & William L.
Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency and the New Certiorari:  Requiem for the Learned Hand
Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 339-42 (1996) (making a similar proposal).
20. Martin, supra note 1, at 183.
21. Judges today hear more oral arguments per sitting and receive larger briefs.
Martin reflects on his own experience as a law clerk on the Sixth Circuit by
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The third section of Judge Martin’s article offers historical material
on the unpublished opinion.  Judge Martin first traces its origins to a
1964 Judicial Conference resolution, which admonished judges to
publish only decisions that have general precedential value and to
make the decisions succinct.23  During the 1970s, the Federal Judicial
Center (FJC) issued a report proposing standards which recognized
that judges must devote more resources to providing a published
opinion than a written explanation.24  By 1974, every regional circuit
had adopted a publication plan that prescribed guidance for issuing
published determinations.25  Judge Martin astutely observes that today
“unpublished opinion” is “a fine, almost meaningless distinction in a
world of electronic legal research,” which enables all appellate
decisions to be published in some form.26
Judge Martin then reviews the status of unpublished
determinations.  He observes that the Sixth Circuit has a
presumption in favor of publishing opinions and against publishing
orders.27  Judges must evaluate many factors when deciding whether
to publish.  Although the court’s local rules do not mandate
publication of determinations that overturn district court decisions or
that include dissents or concurrences, the jurist claims that the circuit
usually publishes reversals and opinions with dissents.28  Three-judge
                                                                
recounting that during a three-week sitting, his judge heard as many as twenty-seven
cases, which is three cases a day, three days a week. See id. at 182.
22. In 1945, one in forty cases was appealed, but in 1988, one in eight cases was
appealed.  See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 18, at
110 (offering statistical data on the increase in caseloads for appellate judges); see also
Martin, supra note 1, at 183.
23. See Martin, supra note 1, at 184 (recalling that during Judge Martin’s
clerkship in 1963-64, nearly all opinions were published, but courts were on the
“cusp of change”); see also JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (1964).
24. See ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF
JUDICIAL OPINIONS 3, 22-23 (Federal Judicial Center Research Series No. 73-2, 1973);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 620 et seq. (1994) (authorizing the FJC as the research arm of the
federal courts).
25. See William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Limited Publication in the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits, 1979 DUKE L.J. 806, 808 (stating that the limited publication
plans had the immediate effect of reducing the number of published opinions from
48.4% to 37.2% between 1973 and 1977); see also Martin, supra note 1, at 184-85
(arguing that the reduction in unpublished opinions would reduce the quality of the
opinions).
26. Martin, supra note 1, at 185-86 (citation omitted); see also infra note 93 and
accompanying text (stating that the commission report found all but three appeals
courts make unpublished opinions available on Lexis and Westlaw).
27. See Martin, supra note 1, at 186; see also 6TH CIR. R. 206(b) (formerly 6TH CIR.
R. 24(b)) (“Designation for Publication.  An opinion or order shall be designated for
publication upon the request of any member of the panel.”).
28. See 6TH CIR. R. 206(a) (formerly 6TH CIR. R. 24(a)) (providing criteria for
publication of decisions).  For example, Sixth Circuit Rule 206(a)(4) considers
“whether [the Sixth Circuit decision] is accompanied by a concurring or dissenting
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panels make the publication determination after oral argument and
generally the decisions are published, unless a majority rejects
publication; formal votes are rare and judges typically defer to any
panel member who strongly urges publication.29
This subsection of Judge Martin’s article provides informative
insights on appellate courts’ operations.  Perhaps most revealing is
the striking inconsistency that attends the courts’ reliance on
unpublished opinions.  Illustrative are the criteria that govern
issuance of a published decision, the weight assigned unpublished
determinations, and litigants’ ability to cite them.30  Several tribunals
specifically mandate publication when opinions include
concurrences or dissents or reverse published district court
judgments.31  Others entrust publication to judicial discretion, but
even their decisional processes vary.32  Most appeals courts permit
nonpublication on a unanimous or majority panel vote,33 although a
few leave the determination to individual judges’ discretion34 and one
                                                                
opinion.” 6TH CIR. R. 206(a)(4).  Rule 206(a)(5) considers “whether [the Sixth
Circuit decision] reverses the decision below . . . .”  6TH CIR. R. 206(a)(5); see also
Martin, supra note 1, at 186-87 (stating that “[i]t is fair to say that reversals or
opinions with dissents are almost always published” in the Sixth Circuit); Reynolds &
Richman, supra note 25, at 810-14, 821-33 (affording history of publication of
decisions in the Sixth Circuit); infra note 115 and accompanying text (examining
Judge Martin’s assertion that reversals and opinions with dissent are usually
published).
29. See Martin, supra note 1, at 187-88.  The Sixth Circuit has no mechanism for
litigants to submit publication requests, but some courts do. See id. at 188; see also 4TH
CIR. R. 36(b) (“Counsel may move for publication of an unpublished opinion, citing
reasons.  If such motion is granted, the unpublished opinion will be published
without change in result.”); 11TH CIR. R. 36-3 (providing that, upon motion by a
party, the panel may by unanimous vote order a previously unpublished decision to
be published).
30. See Martin, supra note 1, at 186-88.  See generally Gregory C. Sisk, The
Balkanization of Appellate Justice:  The Proliferation of Local Rules in the Federal Circuits, 68
U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1997) (discussing procedural variances from court to court).
31. See, e.g., D.C. CIR. R. 36(a) (providing that the court publishes “opinions and
explanatory memoranda that have general public interest,” i.e., cases of first
impression, or if reversing a “published agency or district court decision”); 9TH CIR.
R. 36-2 (providing the criteria necessary for the publication of an opinion, including
if it includes a concurrence or a dissent); see also Martin, supra note 1, at 187.
32. Compare 4TH CIR. R. 36(b) (affording the court discretion to provide limited
explanations without facts or background, but providing no guidance as to which
opinions should be published), with 8TH CIR. R. APP. I (allowing a court to decide
whether to publish an opinion and providing scenarios when publishing an opinion
would be appropriate), and Martin, supra note 1, at 187 n.46 (discussing the collegial
way Sixth Circuit judges determine whether to publish an opinion).  See also Reynolds
& Richman, supra note 25, at 810-14, 821-33 (providing history of the publication
decision in the Fourth Circuit).
33. See, e.g., 1ST CIR. R. 36.2(b) (stating that panel members shall discuss and
decide the publication status of a case); 3D CIR. I.O.P. 5.3 (according the majority of
the panel the authority to determine publication status); see also Martin, supra note 1,
at 187 (discussing the panel decision regarding publication in the Sixth Circuit).
34. See supra note 32 (comparing appeals court practices).
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allows nonpublication unless a majority chooses to publish.35
The third subpart examines the prevalence of unpublished
opinions.  Judge Martin finds historical data on their numbers scarce;
however, he does muster some information.36  The author consults
current material on unpublished decisions maintained by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Administrative
Office), the federal courts’ administrative arm, and claims that the
Sixth Circuit approximates the national average by issuing
unpublished dispositions in seventy-nine percent of its cases.37
Section four of Judge Martin’s article supplies practical and policy
justifications for using unpublished opinions.  First, selective
publication has the pragmatic benefit of increasing the courts’
productivity.38  The writer asserts that he and his clerks spend about
half the time on an average unpublished decision as a published
opinion because the unpublished decision is fact-driven, requires
only four typewritten pages, and implicates clear points of law.39  “The
relative straightforwardness of the legal questions in an unpublished
opinion also saves research time,” as the issues’ recurring nature
reduces the need for novel research.40  The author admonishes that
practicality is only one, and never a dispositive, element as the
publication decision is merit-based.41  Second, Judge Martin
enunciates a policy rationale.  He contends that courts must
distinguish “opinions worthy of publication, and of making a
meaningful contribution” to precedent, from ones that “merely apply
                                                                
35. See 11TH CIR. R. 36-2 (“An opinion shall be unpublished unless a majority of
the panel decides to publish it.”); see also Merritt, supra note 9, at 1386 (finding
similar diversity among Courts of Appeals in decisions about whether to publish an
opinion); Nichols, supra note 11, at 924-27 (same); Martin, supra note 1, at 188
(stating that in the Sixth Circuit, “[o]pinions are published unless a majority of the
panel votes against publication”).
36. See Martin, supra note 1, at 188-89; see also Reynolds & Richman, supra note
25, at 814-16 (providing historical data on the Fourth and Sixth Circuits).
37. See Martin, supra note 1, at 189 (citation omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 601 et
seq. (1994) (authorizing the Administrative Office).
38. See Martin, supra note 1, at 189-91; see also Nichols, supra note 11, at 927-28
(contending that selective publication avoids the “absurdity of destroying forests to
distribute masses of prolix and repetitious material”).
39. See Martin, supra note 1, at 189-91; see also Merritt, supra note 9, at 1392
(asserting that publishing every opinion provides only marginal benefits); Reynolds
& Richman, supra note 25, at 816-21 (analyzing opinions’ length and the time to
produce them).
40. Martin, supra note 1, at 190 (finding that the legal questions are easily
answered after many years on the bench and assuming that his “colleagues have the
same experience”).
41. See id. at 191 (claiming that the decision to publish is based on the merits of
each case with the practical benefits of saving paper and library space seldom
factoring into the consideration); see also Reynolds & Richman, supra note 25, at 807-
08 (surveying practical rationales).
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settled law to decide a dispute between parties.”42  This differentiation
maintains a cohesive, understandable corpus of law, and emphasizing
important appeals responds to the information explosion.43  The
Sixth Circuit resolves seven percent of argued cases without opinion
from the bench, but Judge Martin finds the number too high and
claims that most litigants “deserve a cogent, written explanation.”44
He calls for sharply restricted party citation to unpublished
determinations because this will maintain the decisions’ non-
precedential status:  “as strongly as I believe in the production of
unpublished opinions, I am just as adamantly opposed” to their
citation.45  Judge Martin asserts that precluding citation conserves the
research time of judges and litigants and minimizes any remaining
unfairness that may result from parties’ unequal access to
unpublished determinations by limiting the creation of a secret body
of law.46
Judge Martin urges that his Sixth Circuit colleagues tighten the
local rules that govern citation to provide that “unpublished opinions
have no precedential value and are not even the least bit
persuasive.”47 The jurist lacks “encyclopedic knowledge” of
publication practices but believes that he possesses sufficient
familiarity to state that the court permits rather liberal citation.48  His
                                                                
42. See Martin, supra note 1, at 189; see also Merritt, supra note 9, at 1392
(asserting that only case law expounding or creating new law warrants publication).
43. See Martin, supra note 1, at 191-92 (insisting that judges can make this
distinction “in an extremely high percentage of the cases”); see also Nichols, supra
note 11, at 924 (maintaining that judges sometimes err in deciding to publish or not
to publish their decision, but that these errors are not so extensive that the selective
publication system should be abandoned).
44. See Martin, supra note 1, at 192-93 (citation omitted); see also id. at 193 n.69
(stating that the Second Circuit is the only other court that employs this practice and
only in a few appeals); Merritt, supra note 9, at 1386, 1394 (explaining history of the
practice in the Sixth Circuit); Reynolds & Richman, supra note 25, at 807-08
(surveying policy rationales); 2D CIR. R. 0.23 (providing for disposition of cases in
court or by summary order); 6TH CIR. R. 19 (allowing a panel to dispose of a case in
open court after oral argument if every judge on the panel believes there is no
jurisprudential purpose to providing a written opinion).
45. Martin, supra note 1, at 193 (stating that “[t]his is the gravamen of this
article”); see also Nichols, supra note 11, at 928 (maintaining that the “prohibition
against citing unpublished material should be maintained, and those materials
should continue to be nonprecedential”).
46. See Martin, supra note 1, at 194-97 (arguing that citing unpublished decisions
creates a larger body of law which is less accessible and results in research being
more difficult and more expensive).
47. Id. at 194-95.  Several courts so provide.  See, e.g., D.C. CIR. R. 28(c) (stating
that unpublished orders, judgments and dispositions shall not be cited as
precedent); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4 (stating that unpublished decisions are “not
precedent, except under the doctrine of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the
case,” but may still be persuasive).
48. See Martin, supra note 1, at 194.  Some courts also permit liberal citation. See,
e.g., 10TH CIR. R. 36.3 (allowing unpublished opinions to be cited as persuasive
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survey of many tribunals’ strictures once again shows the great
disparity because, for example, some allow citation for various
purposes, even as others explicitly provide that unpublished
dispositions lack any precedential value.49
B. Critical Analysis
Judge Martin significantly enhances understanding of the Sixth
Circuit through the lens of unpublished decisions and two decades of
experience.  Perhaps most important, the judge perceptively reveals
the enormous discrepancies in system-wide publication practices.  He
specifically finds that the Sixth Circuit’s use of unpublished opinions
approximates the national average50 while opining that the tribunal
assigns the determinations too much weight and permits their overly
frequent citation.51
The jurist provides numerous instructive insights on how the Sixth
Circuit functions that he derives primarily from practical, daily
dispute resolution.  Judge Martin seems to state expressly, or at least
strongly implies, that he believes the court operates effectively by, for
instance, providing published decisions in appeals that merit them52
and delivering appellate justice by, for example, promptly,
economically, and fairly treating cases.53  The writer apparently
admits, however, that the appeals courts fail to attain the appellate
ideal:  merit-based disposition of every appeal after full briefing and
oral argument, close consultation among three active circuit judges,
                                                                
authority, but as not binding precedent); 11TH CIR. R. 36-2 (same).
49. See Martin, supra note 1, at 194-95 (explaining the use of unpublished
decisions by some appeals courts and problems resulting from this use); see also
Merritt, supra note 9, at 1386 (finding similar diversity among Courts of Appeals
concerning citation of unpublished opinions).
50. See Martin, supra note 1, at 189 (positing that the national average for
unpublished decisions for cases terminated on the merits after oral hearing or
submission on briefs in 1995-1996 was 76% while the Sixth Circuit average was
78.9%).
51. See id. at 194 (noting that the Sixth Circuit liberally uses unpublished
decisions).
52. See id. at 191 (maintaining that, although unpublished opinions save time,
publication decisions are based primarily on the merits).  The Commission finds that
every appeals court so operates and seems to define this idea in terms of satisfactory
performance vis-à-vis the parameters that it assessed.  See COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 2, at ix-xi, 29-30; infra notes 70-94 and accompanying text (discussing the
Commission’s findings).
53. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating that the rules of the U.S. district courts shall
secure a “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination”); see also Patrick Johnston,
Problems in Raising Prayers to the Level of Rule:  The Example of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 1, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1325, 1331-92 (1995) (commenting on the construction
of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to ensure a speedy trial); Carl
Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV.
1264, 1286 n.90 (1996) (discussing Rule 1).
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and issuance of a published opinion that thoroughly explicates the
decision reached.54  Indeed, too great reliance on unpublished
determinations could be one telling indicator that a tribunal
performs less efficaciously than it might and may not be dispensing
justice, while widespread dependence on these opinions shows that
modern courts no longer even aspire to achieve this ideal.55
Despite Judge Martin’s valuable contributions to understanding
the Sixth Circuit, he incompletely describes the court.  In fairness,
the judge does not purport to afford a comprehensive account of
circuit performance, and the jurist candidly concedes that he
premises many perceptions on practical experience, personal
knowledge, and anecdotes, rather than empirical data that has been
systematically collected, assessed, and synthesized.56  For instance,
readers profit from knowing that the tribunal resolves seven percent
of argued appeals orally57 and from Judge Martin’s opinion that he
and his colleagues can correctly identify cases that should be
published, that the judges rarely differ on this determination,58 and
that selective publication improves productivity.59  However, these
and other ideas that Judge Martin expresses are controversial and
critics have contested several of them, although much that the jurist
states is empirically verifiable or at least could be informed by
carefully assembled empirical data.60  More specifically, it is difficult
to ascertain whether courts’ publication determinations are accurate
without evaluating the legal and factual issues posed in many specific
appeals to determine whether the issuance of published dispositions
would have improved dispute resolution. Regardless of how
instructive unpublished decisions are in fact, they cannot serve as a
surrogate for overall circuit operations, which range across a broad
spectrum as concrete as courthouse construction and as abstract as
circuit law’s coherence.
                                                                
54. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 10, at 14-30 (outlining the ideal adjudicative
process for appeals courts); REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra
note 18, at 109 (highlighting some of the hallmarks of our appellate justice system).
55. See sources cited supra note 54; Merritt, supra note 9, at 1388 (suggesting that
oral arguments afforded can serve as a measure of a court’s health).
56. See Martin, supra note 1, at 186 (relating Judge Martin’s observations of the
manner in which the Sixth Circuit addresses cases).
57. See id. at 193.
58. See id. at 190-91.
59. See id. at 190.
60. See infra notes 126-51 and accompanying text (supporting the idea that
certain information, including some information that Judge Martin and the
Commission produced, cannot support definitive conclusions); see also supra notes
14-15 and accompanying text (contesting some of Judge Martin’s views and
methods).
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In short, the limited empirical data that Judge Martin supplies and
his somewhat narrow focus on unpublished opinions restrict efforts
to determine with confidence how well the Sixth Circuit actually
functions.  This Essay’s second section, therefore, consults the work
of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts
of Appeals to ascertain whether its empirical nature or breadth
permits more definitive conclusions.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE COMMISSION’S WORK
A. Descriptive Analysis
1. Authorization of the Commission and a description of its work
The history of the Commission requires relatively little evaluation
here, as the background has been rather thoroughly assessed
elsewhere.61  Nonetheless, some treatment is warranted because this
can enhance appreciation of the Commission’s endeavor while
facilitating comparison with Judge Martin’s In Defense of Unpublished
Opinions62 and the formulation of more certain determinations
related to the Sixth Circuit.
The genesis of the Commission was a lengthy dispute that
principally implicates the large size of the Ninth Circuit.  Since 1983,
there have been many attempts to restructure the court; however, in
1997, Congress authorized a study of the appellate system, which was
to emphasize this tribunal.63  Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
chose as commissioners retired United States Supreme Court Justice
Byron R. White, Sixth Circuit Judge Gilbert S. Merritt, Ninth Circuit
Judge Pamela Ann Rymer, District Judge William D. Browning of
Arizona, and immediate past American Bar Association (ABA)
President N. Lee Cooper.64
                                                                
61. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-6 (discussing the creation, mission,
and activities of the Commission).  Other authors have discussed relevant
background material relating to the Commission.  See, e.g., Procter Hug, Jr., The
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals’ Final Report:  An
Analysis of the Commission’s Recommendations for the Ninth Circuit, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
887 (1999) (outlining the Commission’s draft report and arguing against a
reconfiguration of the Ninth Circuit); Jennifer Spreng, Three Divisions in One Circuit?
A Critique of the Recommendations from the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the
Federal Court of Appeals, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 551 (1999) (listing and discussing the
Commission recommendations); Carl Tobias, Suggestions for Studying the Federal
Appellate System, 49 FLA. L. REV. 189 (1997) (recommending specific modes of study
for the Commission).
62. See Martin, supra note 1.
63. See infra note 64 (discussing the formation of the Commission).
64. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 92 app. B (listing the Commission
TOBIASPP2.DOC 6/18/2001  1:05 PM
2000] THE MODERN SIXTH CIRCUIT 1071
During 1998, the commissioners sought much relevant information
in six public hearings, in surveys of appeals and district judges and
appellate attorneys, and in studies performed by the Federal Judicial
Center (FJC) staff.  The Commission specifically gathered material
regarding the courts’ work.  For example, it assembled data on the
percentage of appeals that the appellate courts afforded oral
arguments and published opinions, on the time that the tribunals
need to resolve cases, and on the measures that the courts use to
address the steadily growing dockets which have dramatically
changed them since the 1970s.65
The Commission analyzed all of the information that it had
accumulated or had received, and on October 7, 1998, the
commissioners issued a tentative draft report and suggestions for
which they solicited public comment over a thirty-day period.66  Few
people who responded or testified at the earlier hearings were judges
of, or practiced before, the Sixth Circuit, although a tiny number of
witnesses or submissions expressly mentioned this tribunal.67  After
the Commission reviewed the public input, the entity made minimal
changes and issued a final report that essentially recommended a
divisional arrangement for the Ninth Circuit and the other courts as
they grow.68  The commissioners also collected valuable empirical
                                                                
members and their relevant biographical information); see also Departments of
Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat. 2440, 2491 (1997).  The Act assigned
the Chief Justice of the United States the power to appoint five members to the
Commission and assigned the Commission three functions:
(i) study the present division of the United States into the several judicial
circuits;
(ii) study the structure and alignment of the Federal Court of Appeals
system, with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit; and
(iii) report to the President and the Congress its recommendations for such
changes in circuit boundaries or structure as may be appropriate for the
expeditious and effective disposition of the caseload of the Federal Courts of
Appeals, consistent with fundamental concepts of fairness and due process.
Id. § 305(a)(1)(B), § 305(a)(2)(A).
65. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 21-25, 39 (examining two recent
innovations in the federal appellate courts:  the adoption of differentiated decisional
processes and the use of central staff attorneys); see also REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 18, at 109 (stating that caseload increases have
transformed the circuits).
66. See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF
APPEALS, TENTATIVE DRAFT REPORT (Oct. 7, 1998), available at http://app.comm.
uscourts.gov/report/appstruc.pdf.
67. See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF
APPEALS, PUBLIC HEARINGS AND TESTIMONY (Mar. 19, 1999), available at http://app.
comm.uscourts.gov/schedule.htm (providing witness lists and testimony from all
hearings, including testimony submitted by persons who did not appear at the public
hearings).
68. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 57 (recommending that it is better
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data on the Sixth Circuit.69
2. Commission data on the Sixth Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is in the
middle or upper range of the appeals courts based on numerous,
applicable considerations, all involving size but only one of which
measures performance.  The circuit serves the second biggest
population (30 million people), encompasses the fifth largest
geographic area (178,000 square miles), ties three courts for the
third highest number of federal districts (9), has the third largest
complement of active appellate judges (16), equals two other
tribunals for the third largest number of district judges (62), annually
receives the sixth greatest number of cases (4,600), and each year
resolves the fifth highest number of appeals (4,600).70
Throughout the 1997 fiscal year, members of the Sixth Circuit
decided 2,100 cases on the merits, which was the fifth largest statistic
in the appellate system.71  The court concomitantly terminated 132
appeals on the merits per authorized active judgeship, as compared
to the national average of 155.72  This meant that the Sixth Circuit
concluded the seventh highest number of cases per authorized
judgeship.73
During the 1997 fiscal year, judges of the Sixth Circuit granted oral
arguments in fifty percent of the appeals in which the court resolved
the issue on the merits.74  The figure was considerably higher than the
system-wide average of forty percent, was surpassed only in the First,
Second and Seventh Circuits and was twenty percentage points
greater than the numbers compiled by the Third, Fourth, Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits, which conducted oral arguments in only thirty
percent of their cases.75
For the 1997 fiscal year, Sixth Circuit judges issued published
                                                                
for California, which contributes the most to the caseload of the Ninth Circuit, to be
subject to division within the same circuit than to be split between two circuits, which
would divide the common body of law on issues important in the Pacific Rim).
69. See id. at 13-14 (describing the research and analyses performed by the
Commission).
70. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 27, tbl. 2-9 (listing the circuit
population, size, composition, and number of judgeships for the appeals courts);
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4, at 93, tbl. 1 (listing the number of appellate
judgeships, appeals filed, and appeals terminated by any method).  The data listed in
the Essay are for the 1997 fiscal year, unless otherwise indicated.
71. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4, at 93, tbl. 1.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 93, tbl. 2.
75. See id.
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opinions in eighteen percent of the appeals that the court decided
on the merits.76  This statistic was five percentage points beneath the
national average and was higher than only the Third, Fourth, and
Eleventh Circuits.77 In the 1997 fiscal year, members of the Sixth
Circuit correspondingly terminated twenty-four percent of the cases
on the merits after oral argument.78  The figure was two percent
greater than the system-wide average and higher than seven other
courts.79
Throughout the 1997 fiscal year, thirty-four percent of three-judge
panels that concluded cases after oral argument in the Sixth Circuit
included at least one visiting appellate or district court judge, while
only eight of the 168 panels constituted had three active Sixth Circuit
members.80  The thirty-four percent figure was one point above the
national average and was the sixth largest.81  By way of comparison,
zero and sixty-four percent of three-judge panels assembled
respectively in the District of Columbia and Eleventh Circuits had a
participant who was not an active member of the appellate court.82
Between the 1995 and 1997 fiscal years in the Sixth Circuit, the
median time interval for counseled, civil, non-prisoner cases that the
court resolved after hearing or submission was sixteen months from
the notice of appeal to final disposition.83  The Sixth Circuit was
slower than every other court, except the Ninth Circuit which needed
18.2 months, while the systemwide average during this period was
12.4 months.84  Moreover, the Sixth Circuit ranked tenth for one and
eleventh for two other indicia that the commissioners used in
calculating time to disposition, even though the court was faster than
the national average vis-à-vis the remaining two parameters.85
The Commission compiled additional material that implicates
management practices.86  The entity considered distinctive virtually
                                                                
76. See id. at 93, tbl. 3.  This confirms the figure that Judge Martin supplied.  See
supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (stating that Judge Martin found the Sixth
Circuit issued unpublished decisions approximately 80% of the time).
77. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4, at 93, tbl. 3.
78. See id. at 94, tbl. 5.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 108, tbl. 6a (providing a 34% figure); CHARLES E. GRASSLEY,
CHAIRMAN’S REPORT ON THE APPROPRIATE ALLOCATION OF JUDGESHIPS IN THE UNITED
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS, ANALYSIS OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 3 (1999) (asserting that
eight out of 168 panels had three active Sixth Circuit members).
81. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4, at 108, tbl. 6a.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 95, tbl. 7.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 101-16 (summarizing management practices within the existing
appeals courts).
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no aspect of Sixth Circuit operations involving staff organization and
general duties, alternative dispute resolution (ADR), case screening,
and non-argument decisionmaking.  For example, the court, as all
circuits, uses a “mediation or conference program to resolve some
appeals by settlement, with little or no judicial intervention”87 and,
like most tribunals, does not employ judges to screen cases for oral
argument.88
The Commission also provided information on important issues
regarding opinions and publication.  It found different publication
rates across tribunals, but relatively consistent “formal criteria that
courts say govern their decisions about what to publish.”89  Between
the 1995 and 1997 fiscal years, the Sixth Circuit compiled figures
measuring opinion publication, which were respectively twenty,
seventeen, and twelve percentage points lower than the system-wide
average for orally argued appeals for decisions with a dissent and for
reversals.90  The Commission concomitantly observed that the courts
have long followed diverse traditions for publishing and that all
tribunals “(except D.C.) have, since 1987, even further reduced their
publication rates.”91  The Sixth Circuit published twenty-two percent
of its merit terminations in 1987, a statistic that declined to seventeen
percent by 1993 and remained constant at eighteen percent in 1997.92
The Commission correspondingly reported that every court, except
the Third, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, makes unpublished opinions
available on LEXIS and Westlaw.93 Moreover, the entity found
“substantial variation” in courts’ practices and policies respecting the
citability of unpublished decisions but “no significant disuniformity of
procedure among” tribunals allowing citation for any persuasive value
it might have.94
                                                                
87. Id. at 102. See generally JAMES B. EAGLIN, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE PRE-
ARGUMENT CONFERENCE PROGRAM IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS:  AN
EVALUATION 1 (1990) (listing the three purposes behind Sixth Circuit Local Rule 18:
“(1) explore settlement possibilities, (2) resolve procedural issues, and (3) clarify
issues in the appeal”); ROBERT J. NIEMIC, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MEDIATION AND
CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 52-57 (1997) (describing
the pre-argument conference program for the Sixth Circuit).
88. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4, at 103-04.
89. Id. at 110.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 111-12.
92. See id. at 112, tbl. 10.
93. Id. at 112; see also Merritt, supra note 9, at 1392-93 (describing criticisms that
arise when opinions are reported on LEXIS and Westlaw but not in the official
reporters, including “the definitional problem of what is an opinion,” but noting the
limited availability of unpublished opinions).
94. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4, at 112.  Sixth Circuit appellants, district
judges and appellate attorneys surveyed by the Commission seemed relatively
satisfied with the court’s consistency and predictability as well as with the court’s
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3. A closer comparison of the Sixth Circuit with other courts
My critical analysis addresses major difficulties that complicate
efforts to reach definitive determinations about any court’s
performance.95 For example, the material collected by the
Commission apparently lacks certain qualities, such as sufficient
comprehensiveness and refinement to sustain concrete conclusions.96
Despite those problems, this Essay evaluates the Sixth Circuit by
attempting to provide for the difficulties and by comparing its
performance with that of other tribunals using the factors for which
the Commission assembled information.
Consideration of all the material above indicates that the court
functions less well than it might.  Instructive examples include the
rather few appeals that the court terminates on the merits per
authorized active judgeship, the relatively low percentage of cases
that receive published opinions, the comparatively high percentage
of visiting judges whom the tribunal employs, and the statistics that
involve most of the criteria deployed in assessing time to disposition.97
Even when the Sixth Circuit attains or approximates the national
average, as the court does respectively for two indicia regarding speed
of resolution and percentage of visitors, the tribunal compiles
numbers that only differ minimally from this systemic figure.98
The above criteria are valuable measures of efficacious operation
and appellate justice principally because they involve important
process values such as broad court access.99 The rather low
percentage of published opinions issued specifically suggests that the
Sixth Circuit might work more ineffectively, and dispense less justice,
                                                                
overall performance.  See id. at 19-21, 23-24, 47 (summarizing the results of a 1998
FJC survey of circuit and district judges).
95. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text (analyzing the incompleteness
of Judge Martin’s explanation of the publication decision process in the Sixth
Circuit).
96. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (noting the lack of empirical
data to support some conclusions about courts’ decisions not to publish).
97. See supra notes 72-73, 76-77, 80-85 and accompanying text (demonstrating the
large number of cases decided in the Sixth Circuit, the high number of unpublished
cases, and the court’s need for visiting judges to meet its scheduling demands).
98. See supra notes 80-81, 85 (showing that the Sixth Circuit was one of the lowest-
ranked courts in terms of speed of case resolution).
99. See generally ROBERT COVER & OWEN FISS, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE
(1979); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Cost of Complexity and Complex Litigation, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1467-68 (discussing process values); Martha J. Dragich, Will the
Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish?  Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to
Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757, 775-76
(1995) (arguing that public access to judicial opinions “allow[s] citizens to act
lawfully, enable[s] parties to determine when litigation is appropriate, permit[s] trial
courts to reach correct results in most cases, and ensure[s] that appellate courts can
decide future cases fairly and efficiently”).
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than the court could, as publication can increase judicial
accountability and visibility as well as fairness to parties.  The Sixth
Circuit does perform relatively well in terms of some parameters,
however.  Most important, the court holds oral arguments in half of
the appeals concluded on the merits, a number ten percentage
points higher than the national average and twenty points greater
than four tribunals.100  Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit seems to be
functioning less efficaciously than it might and than numerous other
courts, vis-à-vis the objective data gathered by the Commission.
It might be useful to compare the tribunal with courts that operate
more or less well in terms of these indicators.  The First and Seventh
Circuits apparently perform best.  The First Circuit decides the
largest percentage of cases on the merits in which there is oral
argument and that result in published opinions,101 while the Seventh
Circuit compiles the third and second highest percentages
respectively for these measures.102  The First Circuit also terminates
cases most quickly from the notice of appeal to final disposition and
from last brief to hearing or submission.103  The Seventh Circuit ties
another court as the second fastest from notice of appeal to last brief,
although a minuscule one percent of its panels includes visitors.104
The tribunals do not operate as effectively, however, in terms of every
criterion.  For instance, only two courts resolve fewer appeals per
authorized judgeship than the First Circuit,105 and the Seventh Circuit
decides cases rather slowly in terms of certain factors.106  In short, this
review leaves uncertain which court is best, although both seem to
                                                                
100. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (noting that the Sixth Circuit is
more likely than other circuits to grant oral arguments in cases decided on their
merits); see also Merritt, supra note 9, at 1388 (suggesting that one valid measure of
the health of the appellate decisionmaking process is the percentage of cases argued
orally).  The figure may reflect the attention that the court devotes to some appeals
and explain why it resolves rather few cases per authorized judgeship.
101. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4, at 93-94, tbls. 2 & 5.
102. See id. at 93, tbl. 2.  Indeed, the two tribunals issue published opinions in
more than twice the percentage of appeals as the national average and exceed
virtually all of the remaining courts.  See id.
103. See id. at 95, tbl. 7.  The First and D.C. Circuits tie in the second category.
The median time interval from last brief to hearing or submission is 1.7 months for
both of these courts, while the Sixth Circuit’s median interval is 8.6 months.  Id.
104. See id. at 95, tbl. 7 (presenting statistics concerning median time intervals); id.
at 108, tbl. 6a (presenting statistics on number of visiting judges participating in
decisions).  A quarter of the First Circuit panels had visitors.  See id.
105. See id. at 93, tbl. 1.  The First Circuit decided a total of 116 appeals per
authorized judgeship in 1997.  Id.  The Tenth Circuit decided 115, and the D.C.
Circuit, whose docket includes many administrative appeals, decided 61 appeals in
1997.  Id.
106. See id. at 95, tbl. 7.  These aspects of both courts’ performance might explain
how each is able to furnish so many published opinions and why the First Circuit is so
prompt.
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work better than the other courts of appeals.
It may also be helpful to contrast Sixth Circuit operations with
those of courts that function rather poorly vis-à-vis the objective
indicators.  The comparison suggests that the Third, Fourth, and
Eleventh Circuits apparently perform least well.  They are among the
four tribunals resolving the lowest percentages of appeals on the
merits in which oral argument is conducted107 and hearing the largest
percentages of cases with visitors,108 even though the three courts
write the smallest percentages of published opinions.109  Indeed, the
Eleventh Circuit has the greatest percentage of visiting judges—sixty-
four—a number almost two times the national average and twenty-
one points higher than any other court.110  The parameters are
significant measures for determining whether tribunals work
efficaciously and dispense justice.  The three courts do function
comparatively well in terms of some indicia.  For example, the Third
and Fourth Circuits are among the tribunals that most expeditiously
decide appeals vis-à-vis certain factors for measuring time to
disposition.111  The Eleventh Circuit also terminates substantially
more cases on the merits per authorized judgeship than all of the
courts:  the tribunal’s statistic is 275, the Fifth Circuit is second with
202 and the system-wide average is 155.112
In the final analysis, the Sixth Circuit may not function as well as it
could, and apparently delivers less justice than the tribunal might,
particularly when compared to the remaining courts.  Were the
twelve tribunals placed on a spectrum, the Sixth Circuit would be
closer, and probably next, to the three which seem to operate least
effectively.  For instance, the Sixth Circuit affords a rather small
percentage of published opinions, decides comparatively few appeals
per authorized judgeship, relies substantially on visitors, and resolves
cases quite slowly vis-à-vis several measures.113
                                                                
107. See id. at 93, tbl. 2.
108. See id. at 108, tbl. 6a.
109. See id. at 93, tbl. 3.  The Third and Eleventh Circuits provide fewer than one-
third the percentage of published opinions as the First Circuit, and the Fourth
Circuit issues less than one-quarter of that court’s percentage.  See id.
110. See id. at 108, tbl. 6a.  A high percentage of pro se cases may also explain the
statistic, but a few circuits receive larger percentages and absolute numbers of pro se
cases.  See id. at 93, tbl. 1.
111. See id. at 95, tbl. 7.  The small percentages of oral arguments and published
opinions afforded and the large number of visitors used may explain rather prompt
resolution.
112. See id. at 93, tbl. 1.  The Eleventh Circuit figure might mean that active
appellate judges of the court grant these cases comparatively limited attention.
113. See supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text (explaining these factors).
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4. Other insights on the Sixth Circuit
The Commission’s material provides numerous, informative
perspectives on the contemporary Sixth Circuit and the appellate
system.  Most relevant to the issues treated here, some information
reaffirms, substantiates or elucidates concepts that other observers,
especially Judge Martin, have illuminated.  For example, the material
confirms the percentage of published opinions that the Sixth Circuit
affords and the diverse publication practices that courts follow, in
attempting to address the docket growth that has transformed the
tribunals.114  The information also questions or clarifies certain
notions propounded by Judge Martin.  For instance, the Sixth Circuit
apparently affords published opinions in appeals that involve
reversals and dissents somewhat less frequently than the author
suggests.115
B. Critical Analysis
The Commission substantially increases understanding of the Sixth
Circuit, particularly by providing much relevant empirical data which
reaffirms, complements, or elaborates Judge Martin’s account.
Notwithstanding this important contribution, the Commission’s
effort, in conjunction with Judge Martin’s article, is insufficiently
broad or refined to support conclusive determinations about the
court’s condition. For example, the empirical data on the
percentages of oral arguments afforded and the percentages of
visiting judges employed, considered alone, lack enough applicability.
Knowing only that the Sixth Circuit relies on unpublished decisions
to terminate nearly eighty percent of its appeals is similarly
uninstructive, absent comparison with the figures compiled by other
courts.116  Even consultation of the raw numbers for every appellate
court may be unilluminating, as caseload complexity and appeals’
treatment can vary significantly among the courts.117  For instance,
one tribunal might receive many pro se cases and choose to address
the docket by affording a high percentage of oral arguments and a
low percentage of published opinions, while another court could
                                                                
114. Compare supra text accompanying note 38, with supra text accompanying notes
76, 92.
115. Compare supra text accompanying note 28, with supra text accompanying note
90.
116. See generally WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4 (comparing the various appeals
courts by studying the structure and alignment of the federal appellate system).
117. See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 16, tbls. 2-4, 2-5; at 24, tbl. 2-8; at
27, tbl. 2-9; MCKENNA, supra note 17, at 31-32; Carl Tobias, Some Cautions About
Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 389, 395 (1997).
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have substantially fewer pro se appeals and elect to resolve its
caseload in the opposite manner, yet each tribunal may perform
efficaciously.
C. Summary By Way of Transition
In sum, the ideas expressed by Judge Martin, especially together
with the information that the Commission adduced, improve
comprehension of the modern Sixth Circuit.  However, Judge
Martin’s article and the commissioners’ work, in combination, do not
show with adequate clarity that the court’s situation is problematic
enough to deserve remediation.  Accordingly, the third section of this
essay offers suggestions for the future.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The above assertion that the Sixth Circuit’s circumstances remain
unclear could make the court reluctant to act; however, the tribunal
need not eschew all possibilities.  For example, the Sixth Circuit may
examine some of the ideas expressed by Judge Martin in addition to
the Commission material and other existing information as a prelude
to its own study; it might experiment with salutary approaches,
including proposals proffered by the judge and the Commission; and
it could employ other measures that have promise.  The court’s
scrutiny of this material, its own condition and that of the remaining
tribunals may correspondingly improve circuit operations.
An expert, independent entity might assume primary responsibility
for the analysis.  The Circuit Judicial Council, the governing body,
however, could assemble a group premised on the Ninth Circuit
Evaluation Committee.118 Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr., of that court,
recently appointed this entity to reassess circuit operations in
response to the commissioners’ work and to develop constructive
suggestions for improvement.119  A similar Sixth Circuit committee
should include Judge Martin and Judge Gilbert Merritt.  Each jurist
might draw on his service as chief judge and his experience on the
court for two decades, while Judge Merritt could invoke his
experience as a Commission member and chair of the Judicial
                                                                
118. See Hearings on the Final Report of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the
Federal Courts of Appeals Before the House Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Property, 106th Cong. 61-66 (1999) (statement of Ninth Circuit Judge David
Thompson) (discussing the panel’s process, findings and recommendations).
119. See NINTH CIRCUIT EVALUATION COMMITTEE, INTERIM REPORT (2000). See
generally Procter Hug, Jr. & Carl Tobias, A Preferable Approach for the Ninth Circuit, 88
CAL. L. REV. 1657-71 (2000) (discussing the work and conclusions of the Ninth
Circuit Evaluation Committee).
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Conference Executive Committee.120
A. Additional Study
The court should carefully collect, analyze, and synthesize the
maximum empirical data, which will show as conclusively as possible
whether its situation is sufficiently troubling to require treatment.
The Sixth Circuit must closely consult and capitalize on available
applicable material, particularly the valuable perspectives of Judge
Martin and the Commission,121 while attempting to resolve difficult,
unanswered questions.  If evaluators definitively conclude that the
court needs attention, they should institute efforts to identify
precisely why and to delineate the best remedies.
Assessors could seek the ideas of appeals and district judges and
appellate attorneys on controversial issues raised by the writer or the
commissioners.  For instance, evaluators may want to interview
counsel for insights on the author’s claim that the tribunal properly
designates appeals that do not merit publication.  They might inquire
about matters that the Commission analyzes by, for example,
interviewing:  appellate judges for input on collegiality and whether
selective publication improves productivity, district judges for
opinions on circuit law’s predictability, and lawyers for views on
dispositions’ speed, expense, and fairness. Assessors should also
follow other approaches, however, because these observers’ self-
interest and experiences could intrinsically limit the accuracy of their
ideas.
Evaluators thus may want to track specific cases from filing to
resolution.  This query can illuminate whether the court correctly
identifies appeals that deserve to be published.  Integral to these
inquiries will be determining whether the provision of unpublished
opinions with written determinations explicating the results suffices
for parties and maintains uniform, coherent, certain and predictable
circuit law.122  These are difficult, and possibly intractable, questions,
                                                                
120. See supra note 64 (listing the members of Commission on Structural
Alternatives, which was charged, among other things, with examining the structure
of the Ninth Circuit); see also Merritt, supra note 9, at 1386 (stating the author’s
intent to address criticisms of the judicial decisionmaking process by drawing
primarily upon his experience with the Sixth Circuit); infra note 132 and
accompanying text (discussing Judge Merritt’s proposal in the Commission report to
limit federal civil or criminal jurisdiction in an effort to reduce the number of
appeals).
121. The Sixth Circuit Executive Office, the FJC and the Administrative Office are
obvious sources.
122. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 34-45, 39-40, 47-49.  Evaluators might
also probe whether rulings from the bench afford an adequate basis for litigants to
perfect appeals and for judges to reflect on decisions.  See Merritt, supra note 9, at
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but separate, recent studies of consistency and the en banc process
may offer instructive guidance.123
Assessors could concomitantly attempt to discern why the Sixth
Circuit ranked tenth or below for four of the six parameters
employed by the Commission in evaluating time to disposition, how
the court compiled one of the lowest termination rates per
authorized judgeship, and why the tribunal relied substantially on
visitors.  Especially important will be the correlation, if any, between
those phenomena and circuit size.
Should evaluators conclusively decide that the court’s present
condition necessitates remediation, they must consider many
potential solutions.  Helpful sources will be the commissioners, their
forerunners—including the United States Judicial Conference Long
Range Planning Committee and the Federal Courts Study
Committee—and scholars, who have surveyed numerous responses.124
Assessors might also explore many constructive approaches that other
tribunals have instituted or tested.  For example, every court uses
various forms of ADR and rather refined docket management
mechanisms.125
In short, evaluators must attempt to elucidate the important,
unclear aspects of Judge Martin’s article and the Commission work
                                                                
1394 (stating that the Sixth Circuit makes limited use of bench decisions, but only
when all three judges agree that there is no precedential reason for a written
opinion).
123. See, e.g., Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to
Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 220 (1999) (analyzing the process of en
banc review and concluding that such factors as “reversal of a lower court or agency
ruling, filing a dissent by a panelist, and a liberal ruling” determine whether a court
will rehear a panel decision); Arthur D. Hellman, Maintaining Consistency in the Law of
the Large Circuit, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE 55-90 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990)
(examining the maintenance of uniformity in the application of federal law by
federal appellate courts and focusing on the strengths and weaknesses of the Ninth
Circuit and its en banc process); Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking the Banc:  The Common
Law Process in the Large Appellate Court, 23 ARIZ. ST . L.J. 915, 921 (1991) (providing
further evaluation of inconsistency and conflict in appellate panel decisions of the
Ninth Circuit and of en banc process); Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence:
The Theory and Practice of Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541,
547 (1989) (addressing the trends of the en banc process in the Ninth Circuit).
124. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 18, at
109-23; LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 17, at 67-70, 131-33; BAKER, supra note 10, at
106-286; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 21-25, 59-74.
125. See, e.g., JOE CECIL, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A
LARGE APPELLATE COURT:  THE NINTH CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS PROJECT (1985);
RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE, supra note 123; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 31
(discussing such measures as an “inventory system” of appeals that facilitates routing
of cases with similar issues to the same panel of judges, and maintenance of a team of
six to eight attorneys charged with identifying cases for the court’s mediation
program); supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (summarizing the Commission’s
criticisms of the Sixth Circuit’s management practices, including ADR and case
screening).
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while ascertaining more definitively whether the Sixth Circuit
warrants treatment and, if so, designate the most appropriate
remedies.  The above propositions mean that additional study would
be preferable because it should permit comparatively certain
conclusions and facilitate experimentation and reform.
B. A Miscellany of Ideas
As demonstrated by the analysis above, more study appears to be
the best approach.  However, members of Congress or the Sixth
Circuit might reject this notion because, for instance, they might
think that the court has received adequate examination or that
prompt action is imperative.  Legislators or judges may want to
consider, and could implement, numerous approaches to modernize
the court, some of which Judge Martin or the commissioners mention
and most of which would be compatible with a study.
1. Responses to specific issues that Judge Martin or the Commission raise
The Sixth Circuit should address specific issues raised by Judge
Martin and the Commission.  Illustrative are the jurist’s proposals
that his colleagues restrict litigant ability to cite unpublished
opinions, correspondingly limit their own citation to those
determinations, and replace undue reliance on resolution from the
bench with cogent, written justifications for decisions that most
parties deserve.126  Reducing litigant capacity to cite would decrease
judicial citation, and each phenomenon could minimize the
remaining inequity that attends unequal access to unpublished
opinions.127  The restriction, or elimination, of rulings from the
bench and the concomitant provision of written explanations would
afford several benefits, such as greater fairness for parties and
increased judicial visibility and accountability.  These actions would
also conform Sixth Circuit practices more closely to those of other
courts,128 and perhaps save some expense and time which dissimilar
local appellate strictures can impose.129
Both Judge Martin and the commissioners confirm the
                                                                
126. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text (presenting Judge Martin’s
assessment that certain appeals courts rely too heavily on unpublished opinions and
thereby fail to dispense justice effectively and uphold the appellate ideal).
127. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (describing Judge Martin’s view that
effective court operation entails prompt, economic and fair treatment of cases).
128. See supra notes 48-49, 60-65 and accompanying text (surveying courts’ policies
regarding issuance of and citation to unpublished opinions).
129. See Sisk, supra note 30, at 25-34 (describing the delays and costs imposed by
conflicting procedural rules between the appeals courts).
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conventional wisdom that the Sixth Circuit has confronted, and may
well continue to face, burgeoning caseloads with relatively limited
resources.130  Indeed, these very circumstances prompted Judge
Martin to defend, and the court to rely on, unpublished decisions.
The Commission’s study correspondingly suggests that an insufficient
number of published opinions are afforded, and appeals per
authorized judgeship are terminated, by the Sixth Circuit, while it
depends substantially on visiting judges and may resolve cases too
slowly.131  These concerns strongly implicate docket growth and scarce
resources.  Congress and the court, therefore, have two principal
means of responding.  One alternative would be a reduction in the
number of appeals, essentially by limiting federal civil or criminal
jurisdiction, an idea which Judge Merritt broached in the
Commission report.132  This prospect lacks promise, however, because
senators and representatives appear reluctant to restrict
jurisdiction.133  The second option, accordingly, would be the direct
treatment of caseload increases.
A rather controversial way to address growing dockets would be
expansion of the Sixth Circuit’s judicial and general resources.  For
instance, if lawmakers authorized several additional judgeships, the
court could issue more published opinions, rely less on visitors and
expedite resolution.  A valuable source for the exact number of
judges who might be needed is the Judicial Conference’s suggestions
for Congress, which it bases on relatively conservative calculations of
appeals and judges’ workloads.134  Those recommendations propose
                                                                
130. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (describing the increase in
appellate dockets, and discussing the causes); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at ix
(finding that increasing caseloads have transformed the role and function of U.S.
Courts of Appeals).
131. See supra notes 72-73, 76-77, 80-85 and accompanying text.
132. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 77-88 (urging Congress to adopt a
reformed diversity jurisdiction, which would require a showing of local bias or
complexity of interstate litigation before suit in federal court would be permitted).
See generally LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 17, at 134; MCKENNA, supra note 17, at 141-
53.
133. See Judge Stephen G. Breyer, The Donahue Lecture Series:  Administering Justice in
the First Circuit, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 29, 34-37 (1990) (tracing Congress’ reluctance
to reduce federal jurisdiction to its reluctance to overburden state courts, its
perception that doing so will make little overall difference, its desire to avoid raising
specialist versus generalist controversies, and a fear that constituents will perceive the
reduction as eroding other, more fundamental aspects of federal jurisdiction);
William P. Marshall, Federalization:  A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719, 722-25
(1995) (outlining political pressures faced by Congress to federalize law that
traditionally has been the province of the states); Martin, supra note 1, at 181
(describing the majority of congressional statutes as increasing the caseload of the
federal courts).
134. See Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the Second Clinton Administration, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 741, 753 (1997) (naming the factors considered by the
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two new judicial positions for the Sixth Circuit and are included in a
Senate bill,135 although the questions of whether more judges are
necessary and, if so, how many, remain controversial.  For example,
Judge Martin has argued that the “court’s existing caseload justifies at
least 18 judgeships.”136  Nevertheless, Senator Charles Grassley (R-
Iowa), whose judiciary subcommittee has studied the allocation issue,
recently considered “significant that the vote of the Sixth Circuit
judges to request additional judgeships was not unanimous,” while he
asserted that “it is not clear that new judgeships should be created”
for the court until the tribunal “takes alternative approaches to
manage its caseload efficiently.”137  Moreover, an increase in circuit
membership can reach a point of diminishing returns.138  Thus, this
option might be unrealistic, particularly in light of much
congressional and judicial opposition to expanding the bench.139  If
these views persist, temporary judgeships could be a practical
compromise.
An infusion of nonjudicial resources might be responsive to the
above concerns.  For instance, enlarging the number of staff
attorneys or their responsibilities may decrease the time which judges
spend on administrative tasks, so that they can devote greater effort
to the production of published opinions and perhaps increase the
dispositions per judgeship and limit reliance on visitors. Indeed,
Senator Grassley found that the court’s resistance to enhanced use of
the attorneys in preparing decisions has “foreclosed an opportunity
for judges to reduce the circuit’s workload.”140  Expanding staff size,
                                                                
Judicial Conference when making recommendations for additional judgeships).  But
see GRASSLEY, supra note 80, at 2-7 (criticizing the Judicial Conference factors).
135. See S. 1145, 106th Cong. (1999) (providing for the appointment of two
additional Federal Circuit judges for the Sixth Circuit; last referred to the Judiciary
Committee on May 27, 1999); S. 3071, 106th Cong. (2000) (same). See generally
William H. Rehnquist, 1999 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary (1999).
136. See GRASSLEY, supra note 80, at 1.
137. See id. at 4.
138. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at iii, 29-30 (contending that an
increase in the number of judges often reduces the effectiveness of the court); see also
Jon O. Newman, 1000 Judges—The Limit for an Effective Judiciary, 76 JUDICATURE 187
(1993) (arguing that the size of the federal judiciary should be limited to 1000 judges
so it does not become a vast and ineffective bureaucracy).  See generally BAKER, supra
note 10, at 135.
139. Compare Newman, supra note 138, at 187 (opposing the increase in size of the
federal judiciary), with Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts:  Too Few
Judges, Too Many Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52 (urging an increase in size of the
federal judiciary).  See generally GORDON BERMANT ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
IMPOSING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER OF FEDERAL JUDGES:  ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS
AND IMPLICATIONS (1993); Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided
Government, 47 EMORY L.J. 527 (1998).
140. GRASSLEY, supra note 80, at 2.
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or duties, however, could additionally bureaucratize the tribunal.141
The court should explore other ways to conserve judicial resources.
One helpful example involves bankruptcy appellate panels (“BAPs”),
which the Ninth Circuit applied so successfully that Congress
required every court to consider their implementation.142  This device
minimizes the energy that appellate judges must devote to
bankruptcy cases by invoking decisionmakers, namely bankruptcy
judges, who are not appeals court members and possess specialized
expertise.
One constructive idea that the Senate and the President could
rather felicitously implement is promptly filling the present Sixth
Circuit judicial vacancies.  Since 1995, the court has operated without
the full complement of sixteen active judges whom Congress has
authorized.143  This situation forced the tribunal to rely even more on
visitors and to cancel sixty oral arguments in 1997, imposing
unwarranted cost and delay.144  Expeditious confirmation of nominees
for the four current openings would enable the circuit to afford
higher percentages of published opinions, deploy fewer visiting
judges, and decide cases quicker.
The court might also evaluate those tribunals that function best,
especially vis-à-vis the parameters for which it performs less well, to
determine whether these courts use measures that could improve
circuit operations.  For example, scrutiny of the Eleventh Circuit may
indicate how the tribunal resolves twice the number of appeals per
authorized judgeship.145  Seventh Circuit analysis might show how it
issues published opinions at a rate thirty-two percent higher, while
employing visitors at a rate thirty-three percent lower,146 and deciding
                                                                
141. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 11, at 26-28 (discussing changes in number of
personnel and increases in budget of the federal judiciary over the last 50 years);
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST:  FEDERAL JUDGES AND COURT
ADMINISTRATION 94-125 (1995) (discussing the systemic development of the federal
judicial bureaucracy); see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 23-25 (discussing
the expansion of the number and responsibilities of central staff and law clerks);
MCKENNA, supra note 17, at 49-55 (same); Reynolds & Richman, supra note 25, at 836-
37 (commenting on the danger of having large central staffs with significant roles).
142. See generally Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 104(c),
108 Stat. 4106, 4109-10 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.); see
also LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 17, at 47 (analyzing BAPs and statute).
143. See 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (1994) (indicating that this number of judges is
authorized).
144. See Chronic Federal Judge Shortage Puts Lives, Justice on Hold, LAS VEGAS REV. J.,
Aug. 13, 1997, at A9; see also Bill Kisliuk, Judges’ Conference Clams Circuit—Splitting
Vacancies, THE RECORDER, Aug. 19, 1997, at 1 (analyzing the problems that numerous,
prolonged vacancies create).
145. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4, at 93, tbl. 1 (indicating that 275 appeals
per authorized judgeship are decided on their merits in the Eleventh Circuit).
146. See id. at 108, tbl. 6a (documenting reliance on visiting judges).
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cases along five important measures faster, than the Sixth Circuit.147
Congress and the court could examine, and consider prescribing,
direct approaches to docket increases, which observers—including
Judge Martin, scholars, as well as the Commission and its
predecessors—have thoroughly canvassed during the last half-
century.148  They should attempt to identify measures that would be
most responsive to ways in which the circuit might work better, but
that impose the fewest disadvantages.  Illustrative are mechanisms
which would enable the court to expedite resolution by conserving
resources of the appellate judiciary.  BAPs would seemingly permit
the tribunal to conclude appeals faster and save time of circuit
members by capitalizing on bankruptcy judges’ expertise and
resources with little detriment.  Two-judge panels, or district court
appellate panels149 and ADR would facilitate disposition and save
resources of the circuit judiciary.150  However, the decisional entities
and the alternatives might erode significant process values, such as
judicial visibility and accountability.151 Restricting litigants’ procedural
opportunities, namely oral arguments, would apparently have similar
effects.  These phenomena could concomitantly attend reliance on
unpublished opinions, despite Judge Martin’s persuasive defense.
Judges may be able to designate easily appeals not meriting
publication and to afford written explanations that suffice for parties,
maintain consistent, coherent and predictable circuit law, expedite
appeals, save appellate resources, and honor process values.
Nonetheless, the limited scrutiny accorded unpublished opinions’
invocation precludes very certain conclusions today.
2. A word about experimentation
The earlier discussion indicates that additional study is best,
                                                                
147. See id. at 95, tbl. 7 (referring to the number of months, on average, the court
takes in terminating a case after a hearing or submission, and finding that the
Seventh Circuit is faster than the Sixth).
148. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 18, at
110-25; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 67-76; BAKER, supra note 10, at 151-85,
229-86.
149. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 17, at 131-32; see also COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 2, at 62-65.  Judge Martin thought that “2-judge panels had merit and
should be authorized in the circuits on a trial or pilot basis.” GRASSLEY, supra note 80,
at 3.
150. See Breyer, supra note 133, at 44 (discussing the recent popularity of non-
judicial dispute resolution, especially in matters where the costs of using courts and
the legal system are so exhorbitant that injustice may arise).  See generally BAKER, supra
note 10, at 197.
151. See Merritt, supra note 9, at 1388 (favoring the continuance of oral arguments
before judges because it is consistent with proper standards of visibility,
accountability, and care).  See generally BAKER, supra note 10, at 197.
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however, the Sixth Circuit could institute a few actions without
additional findings that would clearly improve its operations.
Moreover, there might currently be adequate information to institute
productive testing, although some measures’ efficacy remains
unclear.  These ideas mean that Congress and the court may want to
consider experimentation with promising approaches, which could
proceed simultaneously with more study.
The court should closely examine its operations, while the tribunal
might attempt to specify aspects that deserve treatment and test
responsive measures.  The circuit could assess the ideas of Judge
Martin and the commissioners to designate ways in which the court
seems to function less well than it might.  For example, some
Commission information suggests that the tribunal relies too much
on unpublished opinions and visitors and resolves appeals rather
slowly.
After the court has identified features of circuit performance that
could be improved, it should delineate mechanisms that warrant
experimentation.  The tribunal can derive these devices by
identifying courts that operated well vis-à-vis the Commission indicia,
by communicating with other circuits and by contacting the FJC and
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, which are repositories
for relevant information.  The court might specifically evaluate the
larger tribunals, namely the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits,
which have faced docket growth, and should remember that the
Ninth Circuit has experimented with innovative approaches to
caseload increases for many years.
The Sixth Circuit could also consider the Commission suggestions
in addition to the divisional concept.  The court’s large, expanding
docket may lead it to apply two-judge, or district court appellate,
panels. These bodies might foster prompt and inexpensive
disposition of numerous appeals and conserve resources, but the
panels can jeopardize fair decisionmaking and undermine the
judiciary’s accountability and visibility.152  The tribunal could respond
to Senator Grassley’s overture by placing greater reliance on staff
attorneys in the preparation of opinions, but this may increase
bureaucratization.153 Once the court has identified salutary
approaches, it should carefully apply them.
The experimentation conducted must receive rigorous analysis.
                                                                
152. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text (discussing the tradeoff
between non-judicial dispute resolution and advantages of judges’ visibility).
153. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text (describing the possible
dangers of expanding staff size).
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Testing should continue for a sufficient period in diverse enough
contexts to discern confidently the measures’ effectiveness.  An
expert, independent evaluator must systematically gather, assemble,
assess, and synthesize the maximum applicable empirical data.  After
experimentation has received analysis, it should be possible to
determine with great certainty whether the circuit needs remediation
and, if so, why and to designate the best solutions.
Congress and the Sixth Circuit should institute the above
suggestions for several reasons.  First and foremost, the ideas would
enable the tribunal to enhance operations in areas that Judge Martin
or the commissioners indicate need improvement.  Moreover, the
proposals are a good faith attempt to ascertain more clearly whether
the Sixth Circuit in fact requires treatment, and, if so, to delineate
effective remedies.  Finally, the approach could test the accuracy of
the assertions posited by Judge Martin and the Commission.
CONCLUSION
Judge Martin has provided valuable perspectives on the Sixth
Circuit, as witnessed through the prism of unpublished opinions.  His
focus on these decisions, however, is overly narrow, while he provides
minimal empirical data.  The Commission study elaborates the jurist’s
work, yet its endeavor is insufficiently comprehensive and refined,
even in combination with Judge Martin’s ideas, to support conclusive
determinations.  Therefore, more study, perhaps in conjunction with
experimentation, is warranted, while the court should implement
measures that promise to improve its present operations.
